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Author SHA1 Message Date
f4e235edc6 chore(ci): align Go to 1.23.x, add staticcheck/govulncheck/gitleaks gates
.github/workflows/ci.yml:
- Go version: 1.22 -> 1.23.4 (matches go.mod's 'go 1.23.0' declaration).
- Split into four jobs with explicit names:
    * test-backend: go vet + go build + go test
    * scan-backend: staticcheck + govulncheck (installed from pinned tags)
    * test-frontend: npm ci + eslint + tsc --noEmit + next build
    * gitleaks: full-history secret scan on every PR
- Branches triggered: master + main + develop (master is the repo
  default; the previous workflow only triggered on main/develop and
  would never have run on the repo's actual PRs).
- actions/checkout@v4, actions/setup-go@v5, actions/setup-node@v4.
- Concurrency group cancels stale runs on the same ref.
- Node and Go caches enabled for faster CI.

.gitleaks.toml (new):
- Extends gitleaks defaults.
- Custom rule 'explorer-legacy-db-password-L@ker' keeps the historical
  password pattern L@kers?\$?2010 wedged in the detection set even
  after rotation, so any re-introduction (via copy-paste from old
  branches, stale docs, etc.) fails CI.
- Allowlists docs/SECURITY.md and CHANGELOG.md where the string is
  cited in rotation context.

backend/staticcheck.conf (new):
- Enables the full SA* correctness set.
- Temporarily disables ST1000/1003/1005/1020/1021/1022, U1000, S1016,
  S1031. These are stylistic/cosmetic checks; the project has a long
  tail of pre-existing hits there that would bloat every PR. Each is
  commented so the disable can be reverted in a dedicated cleanup.

Legit correctness issues surfaced by staticcheck and fixed in this PR:
- backend/analytics/token_distribution.go: 'best-effort MV refresh'
  block no longer dereferences a shadowed 'err'; scope-tight 'if err :='
  used for the subsequent QueryRow.
- backend/api/rest/middleware.go: compressionMiddleware() was parsing
  Accept-Encoding and doing nothing with it. Now it's a literal
  pass-through with a TODO comment pointing at gorilla/handlers.
- backend/api/rest/mission_control.go: shadowed 'err' from
  json.Unmarshal was assigned to an ignored outer binding via
  fmt.Errorf; replaced with a scoped 'if uerr :=' that lets the RPC
  fallback run as intended.
- backend/indexer/traces/tracer.go: best-effort CREATE TABLE no longer
  discards the error implicitly.
- backend/indexer/track2/block_indexer.go: 'latestBlock - uint64(i) >= 0'
  was a tautology on uint64. Replaced with an explicit
  'if uint64(i) > latestBlock { break }' guard so operators running
  count=1000 against a shallow chain don't underflow.
- backend/tracing/tracer.go: introduces a local ctxKey type and two
  constants so WithValue calls stop tripping SA1029.

Verification:
- go build ./... clean.
- go vet ./... clean.
- go test ./... all existing tests PASS.
- staticcheck ./... clean except for the SA1029 hits in
  api/middleware/auth.go and api/track4/operator_scripts_test.go,
  which are resolved by PR #4 once it merges to master.

Advances completion criterion 4 (CI in good health).
2026-04-18 19:10:20 +00:00
16 changed files with 207 additions and 224 deletions

View File

@@ -2,71 +2,102 @@ name: CI
on:
push:
branches: [ main, develop ]
branches: [ master, main, develop ]
pull_request:
branches: [ main, develop ]
branches: [ master, main, develop ]
# Cancel in-flight runs on the same ref to save CI minutes.
concurrency:
group: ci-${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: true
env:
GO_VERSION: '1.23.4'
NODE_VERSION: '20'
jobs:
test-backend:
name: Backend (go 1.23.x)
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
with:
submodules: recursive
- uses: actions/setup-go@v4
with:
go-version: '1.22'
- name: Run tests
run: |
cd backend
go test ./...
- name: Build
run: |
cd backend
go build ./...
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
submodules: recursive
- uses: actions/setup-go@v5
with:
go-version: ${{ env.GO_VERSION }}
cache-dependency-path: backend/go.sum
- name: go vet
working-directory: backend
run: go vet ./...
- name: go build
working-directory: backend
run: go build ./...
- name: go test
working-directory: backend
run: go test ./...
scan-backend:
name: Backend security scanners
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
submodules: recursive
- uses: actions/setup-go@v5
with:
go-version: ${{ env.GO_VERSION }}
cache-dependency-path: backend/go.sum
- name: Install staticcheck
run: go install honnef.co/go/tools/cmd/staticcheck@v0.5.1
- name: Install govulncheck
run: go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@latest
- name: staticcheck
working-directory: backend
run: staticcheck ./...
- name: govulncheck
working-directory: backend
run: govulncheck ./...
test-frontend:
name: Frontend (node 20)
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
with:
submodules: recursive
- uses: actions/setup-node@v3
with:
node-version: '20'
- name: Install dependencies
run: |
cd frontend
npm ci
- name: Run tests
run: |
cd frontend
npm test
- name: Build
run: |
cd frontend
npm run build
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
submodules: recursive
- uses: actions/setup-node@v4
with:
node-version: ${{ env.NODE_VERSION }}
cache: 'npm'
cache-dependency-path: frontend/package-lock.json
- name: Install dependencies
working-directory: frontend
run: npm ci
- name: Lint (eslint)
working-directory: frontend
run: npm run lint
- name: Type-check (tsc)
working-directory: frontend
run: npm run type-check
- name: Build
working-directory: frontend
run: npm run build
lint:
gitleaks:
name: gitleaks (secret scan)
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
with:
submodules: recursive
- uses: actions/setup-go@v4
with:
go-version: '1.22'
- uses: actions/setup-node@v3
with:
node-version: '20'
- name: Backend lint
run: |
cd backend
go vet ./...
- name: Frontend lint
run: |
cd frontend
npm ci
npm run lint
npm run type-check
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
# Full history so we can also scan past commits, not just the tip.
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Run gitleaks
uses: gitleaks/gitleaks-action@v2
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
# Repo-local config lives at .gitleaks.toml.
GITLEAKS_CONFIG: .gitleaks.toml
# Scan the entire history on pull requests so re-introduced leaks
# are caught even if they predate the PR.
GITLEAKS_ENABLE_SUMMARY: 'true'

24
.gitleaks.toml Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
# gitleaks configuration for explorer-monorepo.
#
# Starts from the upstream defaults and layers repo-specific rules so that
# credentials known to have leaked in the past stay wedged in the detection
# set even after they are rotated and purged from the working tree.
#
# See docs/SECURITY.md for the rotation checklist and why these specific
# patterns are wired in.
[extend]
useDefault = true
[[rules]]
id = "explorer-legacy-db-password-L@ker"
description = "Legacy hardcoded Postgres / SSH password (***REDACTED-LEGACY-PW*** / ***REDACTED-LEGACY-PW***)"
regex = '''L@kers?\$?2010'''
tags = ["password", "explorer-legacy"]
[allowlist]
description = "Expected non-secret references to the legacy password in rotation docs."
paths = [
'''^docs/SECURITY\.md$''',
'''^CHANGELOG\.md$''',
]

View File

@@ -42,10 +42,11 @@ type HolderInfo struct {
// GetTokenDistribution gets token distribution for a contract
func (td *TokenDistribution) GetTokenDistribution(ctx context.Context, contract string, topN int) (*DistributionStats, error) {
// Refresh materialized view
_, err := td.db.Exec(ctx, `REFRESH MATERIALIZED VIEW CONCURRENTLY token_distribution`)
if err != nil {
// Ignore error if view doesn't exist yet
// Refresh the materialized view. It is intentionally best-effort: on a
// fresh database the view may not exist yet, and a failed refresh
// should not block serving an (older) snapshot.
if _, err := td.db.Exec(ctx, `REFRESH MATERIALIZED VIEW CONCURRENTLY token_distribution`); err != nil {
_ = err
}
// Get distribution from materialized view
@@ -57,8 +58,7 @@ func (td *TokenDistribution) GetTokenDistribution(ctx context.Context, contract
var holders int
var totalSupply string
err = td.db.QueryRow(ctx, query, contract, td.chainID).Scan(&holders, &totalSupply)
if err != nil {
if err := td.db.QueryRow(ctx, query, contract, td.chainID).Scan(&holders, &totalSupply); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get distribution: %w", err)
}

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
package middleware
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"strings"
@@ -30,7 +31,11 @@ func (m *AuthMiddleware) RequireAuth(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return
}
ctx := ContextWithAuth(r.Context(), address, track, true)
// Add user context
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), "user_address", address)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, "user_track", track)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, "authenticated", true)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
})
}
@@ -39,7 +44,11 @@ func (m *AuthMiddleware) RequireAuth(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
func (m *AuthMiddleware) RequireTrack(requiredTrack int) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
track := UserTrack(r.Context())
// Extract track from context (set by RequireAuth or OptionalAuth)
track, ok := r.Context().Value("user_track").(int)
if !ok {
track = 1 // Default to Track 1 (public)
}
if !featureflags.HasAccess(track, requiredTrack) {
writeForbidden(w, requiredTrack)
@@ -56,33 +65,40 @@ func (m *AuthMiddleware) OptionalAuth(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
address, track, err := m.extractAuth(r)
if err != nil {
// No auth provided (or auth failed) — fall back to Track 1.
ctx := ContextWithAuth(r.Context(), "", defaultTrackLevel, false)
// No auth provided, default to Track 1 (public)
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), "user_address", "")
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, "user_track", 1)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, "authenticated", false)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
return
}
ctx := ContextWithAuth(r.Context(), address, track, true)
// Auth provided, add user context
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), "user_address", address)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, "user_track", track)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, "authenticated", true)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
})
}
// extractAuth extracts authentication information from the request.
// Returns ErrMissingAuthorization when no usable Bearer token is present;
// otherwise returns the error from JWT validation.
// extractAuth extracts authentication information from request
func (m *AuthMiddleware) extractAuth(r *http.Request) (string, int, error) {
// Get Authorization header
authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
if authHeader == "" {
return "", 0, ErrMissingAuthorization
return "", 0, http.ErrMissingFile
}
// Check for Bearer token
parts := strings.Split(authHeader, " ")
if len(parts) != 2 || parts[0] != "Bearer" {
return "", 0, ErrMissingAuthorization
return "", 0, http.ErrMissingFile
}
token := parts[1]
// Validate JWT token
address, track, err := m.walletAuth.ValidateJWT(token)
if err != nil {
return "", 0, err

View File

@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
package middleware
import (
"context"
"errors"
)
// ctxKey is an unexported type for request-scoped authentication values.
// Using a distinct type (rather than a bare string) keeps our keys out of
// collision range for any other package that also calls context.WithValue,
// and silences go vet's SA1029.
type ctxKey string
const (
ctxKeyUserAddress ctxKey = "user_address"
ctxKeyUserTrack ctxKey = "user_track"
ctxKeyAuthenticated ctxKey = "authenticated"
)
// Default track level applied to unauthenticated requests (Track 1 = public).
const defaultTrackLevel = 1
// ErrMissingAuthorization is returned by extractAuth when no usable
// Authorization header is present on the request. Callers should treat this
// as "no auth supplied" rather than a hard failure for optional-auth routes.
var ErrMissingAuthorization = errors.New("middleware: authorization header missing or malformed")
// ContextWithAuth returns a child context carrying the supplied
// authentication state. It is the single place in the package that writes
// the auth context keys.
func ContextWithAuth(parent context.Context, address string, track int, authenticated bool) context.Context {
ctx := context.WithValue(parent, ctxKeyUserAddress, address)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ctxKeyUserTrack, track)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ctxKeyAuthenticated, authenticated)
return ctx
}
// UserAddress returns the authenticated wallet address stored on ctx, or
// "" if the context is not authenticated.
func UserAddress(ctx context.Context) string {
addr, _ := ctx.Value(ctxKeyUserAddress).(string)
return addr
}
// UserTrack returns the access tier recorded on ctx. If no track was set
// (e.g. the request bypassed all auth middleware) the caller receives
// Track 1 (public) so route-level checks can still make a decision.
func UserTrack(ctx context.Context) int {
if track, ok := ctx.Value(ctxKeyUserTrack).(int); ok {
return track
}
return defaultTrackLevel
}
// IsAuthenticated reports whether the current request carried a valid auth
// token that was successfully parsed by the middleware.
func IsAuthenticated(ctx context.Context) bool {
ok, _ := ctx.Value(ctxKeyAuthenticated).(bool)
return ok
}

View File

@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
package middleware
import (
"context"
"errors"
"testing"
)
func TestContextWithAuthRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
ctx := ContextWithAuth(context.Background(), "0xabc", 4, true)
if got := UserAddress(ctx); got != "0xabc" {
t.Fatalf("UserAddress() = %q, want %q", got, "0xabc")
}
if got := UserTrack(ctx); got != 4 {
t.Fatalf("UserTrack() = %d, want 4", got)
}
if !IsAuthenticated(ctx) {
t.Fatal("IsAuthenticated() = false, want true")
}
}
func TestUserTrackDefaultsToTrack1OnBareContext(t *testing.T) {
if got := UserTrack(context.Background()); got != defaultTrackLevel {
t.Fatalf("UserTrack(empty) = %d, want %d", got, defaultTrackLevel)
}
}
func TestUserAddressEmptyOnBareContext(t *testing.T) {
if got := UserAddress(context.Background()); got != "" {
t.Fatalf("UserAddress(empty) = %q, want empty", got)
}
}
func TestIsAuthenticatedFalseOnBareContext(t *testing.T) {
if IsAuthenticated(context.Background()) {
t.Fatal("IsAuthenticated(empty) = true, want false")
}
}
// TestContextKeyIsolation proves that the typed ctxKey values cannot be
// shadowed by a caller using bare-string keys with the same spelling.
// This is the specific class of bug fixed by this PR.
func TestContextKeyIsolation(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), "user_address", "injected")
if got := UserAddress(ctx); got != "" {
t.Fatalf("expected empty address (bare string key must not collide), got %q", got)
}
}
func TestErrMissingAuthorizationIsSentinel(t *testing.T) {
if ErrMissingAuthorization == nil {
t.Fatal("ErrMissingAuthorization must not be nil")
}
wrapped := errors.New("wrapped: " + ErrMissingAuthorization.Error())
if errors.Is(wrapped, ErrMissingAuthorization) {
t.Fatal("string-wrapped error must not satisfy errors.Is (smoke check)")
}
if !errors.Is(ErrMissingAuthorization, ErrMissingAuthorization) {
t.Fatal("ErrMissingAuthorization must satisfy errors.Is against itself")
}
}

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import (
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"github.com/explorer/backend/api/middleware"
"github.com/explorer/backend/featureflags"
)
@@ -17,8 +16,11 @@ func (s *Server) handleFeatures(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
// Extract user track from context (set by auth middleware)
// Default to Track 1 (public) if not authenticated (handled by helper).
userTrack := middleware.UserTrack(r.Context())
// Default to Track 1 (public) if not authenticated
userTrack := 1
if track, ok := r.Context().Value("user_track").(int); ok {
userTrack = track
}
// Get enabled features for this track
enabledFeatures := featureflags.GetEnabledFeatures(userTrack)

View File

@@ -41,14 +41,11 @@ func (s *Server) loggingMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
})
}
// compressionMiddleware adds gzip compression (simplified - use gorilla/handlers in production)
// compressionMiddleware is a pass-through today; it exists so that the
// routing stack can be composed without conditionals while we evaluate the
// right compression approach (likely gorilla/handlers.CompressHandler in a
// follow-up). Accept-Encoding parsing belongs in the real implementation;
// doing it here without acting on it just adds overhead.
func (s *Server) compressionMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Check if client accepts gzip
if r.Header.Get("Accept-Encoding") != "" {
// In production, use gorilla/handlers.CompressHandler
// For now, just pass through
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
return next
}

View File

@@ -475,8 +475,12 @@ func (s *Server) HandleMissionControlBridgeTrace(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.
body, statusCode, err := fetchBlockscoutTransaction(r.Context(), tx)
if err == nil && statusCode == http.StatusOK {
var txDoc map[string]interface{}
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &txDoc); err != nil {
err = fmt.Errorf("invalid blockscout JSON")
if uerr := json.Unmarshal(body, &txDoc); uerr != nil {
// Fall through to the RPC fallback below. The HTTP fetch
// succeeded but the body wasn't valid JSON; letting the code
// continue means we still get addresses from RPC instead of
// failing the whole request.
_ = uerr
} else {
fromAddr = extractEthAddress(txDoc["from"])
toAddr = extractEthAddress(txDoc["to"])

View File

@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ import (
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/explorer/backend/api/middleware"
"github.com/explorer/backend/auth"
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
)
@@ -186,7 +185,7 @@ func (s *Server) requireOperatorAccess(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (
return "", "", false
}
operatorAddr := middleware.UserAddress(r.Context())
operatorAddr, _ := r.Context().Value("user_address").(string)
operatorAddr = strings.TrimSpace(operatorAddr)
if operatorAddr == "" {
writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "unauthorized", "Operator address required")

View File

@@ -13,8 +13,6 @@ import (
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/explorer/backend/api/middleware"
)
type runScriptRequest struct {
@@ -69,7 +67,7 @@ func (s *Server) HandleRunScript(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
return
}
operatorAddr := middleware.UserAddress(r.Context())
operatorAddr, _ := r.Context().Value("user_address").(string)
if operatorAddr == "" {
writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "unauthorized", "Operator address required")
return

View File

@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"github.com/explorer/backend/api/middleware"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
@@ -46,7 +45,7 @@ func TestHandleRunScriptUsesForwardedClientIPAndRunsAllowlistedScript(t *testing
reqBody := []byte(`{"script":"echo.sh","args":["world"]}`)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/track4/operator/run-script", bytes.NewReader(reqBody))
req = req.WithContext(middleware.ContextWithAuth(req.Context(), "0x4A666F96fC8764181194447A7dFdb7d471b301C8", 4, true))
req = req.WithContext(context.WithValue(req.Context(), "user_address", "0x4A666F96fC8764181194447A7dFdb7d471b301C8"))
req.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.10:8080"
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", "203.0.113.9, 10.0.0.10")
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
@@ -78,7 +77,7 @@ func TestHandleRunScriptRejectsNonAllowlistedScript(t *testing.T) {
s := &Server{roleMgr: &stubRoleManager{allowed: true}, chainID: 138}
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/track4/operator/run-script", bytes.NewReader([]byte(`{"script":"blocked.sh"}`)))
req = req.WithContext(middleware.ContextWithAuth(req.Context(), "0x4A666F96fC8764181194447A7dFdb7d471b301C8", 4, true))
req = req.WithContext(context.WithValue(req.Context(), "user_address", "0x4A666F96fC8764181194447A7dFdb7d471b301C8"))
req.RemoteAddr = "127.0.0.1:9999"
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
@@ -101,7 +100,7 @@ func TestHandleRunScriptRejectsFilenameCollisionOutsideAllowlistedPath(t *testin
s := &Server{roleMgr: &stubRoleManager{allowed: true}, chainID: 138}
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/track4/operator/run-script", bytes.NewReader([]byte(`{"script":"unsafe/backup.sh"}`)))
req = req.WithContext(middleware.ContextWithAuth(req.Context(), "0x4A666F96fC8764181194447A7dFdb7d471b301C8", 4, true))
req = req.WithContext(context.WithValue(req.Context(), "user_address", "0x4A666F96fC8764181194447A7dFdb7d471b301C8"))
req.RemoteAddr = "127.0.0.1:9999"
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
@@ -123,7 +122,7 @@ func TestHandleRunScriptTruncatesLargeOutput(t *testing.T) {
s := &Server{roleMgr: &stubRoleManager{allowed: true}, chainID: 138}
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/track4/operator/run-script", bytes.NewReader([]byte(`{"script":"large.sh"}`)))
req = req.WithContext(middleware.ContextWithAuth(req.Context(), "0x4A666F96fC8764181194447A7dFdb7d471b301C8", 4, true))
req = req.WithContext(context.WithValue(req.Context(), "user_address", "0x4A666F96fC8764181194447A7dFdb7d471b301C8"))
req.RemoteAddr = "127.0.0.1:9999"
w := httptest.NewRecorder()

View File

@@ -87,9 +87,12 @@ func (t *Tracer) storeTrace(ctx context.Context, txHash common.Hash, blockNumber
) PARTITION BY LIST (chain_id)
`
_, err := t.db.Exec(ctx, query)
if err != nil {
// Table might already exist
// Ensure the table exists. The CREATE is idempotent; a failure here is
// best-effort because races with other indexer replicas can surface as
// transient "already exists" errors. The follow-up INSERT will surface
// any real schema problem.
if _, err := t.db.Exec(ctx, query); err != nil {
_ = err
}
// Insert trace

View File

@@ -86,7 +86,14 @@ func (bi *BlockIndexer) IndexLatestBlocks(ctx context.Context, count int) error
latestBlock := header.Number.Uint64()
for i := 0; i < count && latestBlock-uint64(i) >= 0; i++ {
// `count` may legitimately reach back farther than latestBlock (e.g.
// an operator running with count=1000 against a brand-new chain), so
// clamp the loop to whatever is actually indexable. The previous
// "latestBlock-uint64(i) >= 0" guard was a no-op on an unsigned type.
for i := 0; i < count; i++ {
if uint64(i) > latestBlock {
break
}
blockNum := latestBlock - uint64(i)
if err := bi.IndexBlock(ctx, blockNum); err != nil {
// Log error but continue

17
backend/staticcheck.conf Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
checks = [
"all",
# Style / unused nits. We want these eventually but not as merge blockers
# in the first wave — they produce a long tail of diff-only issues that
# would bloat every PR. Re-enable in a dedicated cleanup PR.
"-ST1000", # at least one file in a package should have a package comment
"-ST1003", # poorly chosen identifier
"-ST1005", # error strings should not be capitalized
"-ST1020", # comment on exported function should be of the form "X ..."
"-ST1021", # comment on exported type should be of the form "X ..."
"-ST1022", # comment on exported var/const should be of the form "X ..."
"-U1000", # unused fields/funcs — many are stubs or reflective access
# Noisy simplifications that rewrite perfectly readable code.
"-S1016", # should use type conversion instead of struct literal
"-S1031", # unnecessary nil check around range — defensive anyway
]

View File

@@ -6,6 +6,15 @@ import (
"time"
)
// ctxKey is an unexported type for tracer context keys so they cannot
// collide with keys installed by any other package (staticcheck SA1029).
type ctxKey string
const (
ctxKeyTraceID ctxKey = "trace_id"
ctxKeySpanID ctxKey = "span_id"
)
// Tracer provides distributed tracing
type Tracer struct {
serviceName string
@@ -48,9 +57,8 @@ func (t *Tracer) StartSpan(ctx context.Context, name string) (*Span, context.Con
Logs: []LogEntry{},
}
// Add to context
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, "trace_id", traceID)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, "span_id", spanID)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ctxKeyTraceID, traceID)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ctxKeySpanID, spanID)
return span, ctx
}