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1.8 KiB
1.8 KiB
HYBX OMNL — threat model and audit scope
Trust boundaries
- On-chain policy (
PolicyMath,ComplianceCore) is deterministic given inputs(S0, S1, R)fromIERC20.totalSupplyandReserveCommitmentStore. - Economic truth of R depends on custodian attestation and operational security of signing keys — not on PMM or spot price oracles.
Threats and mitigations
| Threat | Impact | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|
Compromised RESERVE_COMMITTER key |
Fake reserves | Multisig / HSM, key rotation, monitoring on ReserveCommitted |
Compromised attestation signer set (commitReserveAttested) |
Forged threshold commits | Rotate isAttestationSigner, raise attestationThreshold, monitor lineAttestationNonce |
| Compromised CCIP lane | Wrong mirror updates | allowedSourceSelectors, replay protection on messageId |
| Malicious ERC-20 (inflated totalSupply) | False compliance | Register only audited tokens; avoid rebasing tokens without adapter |
| Governance capture | Parameter / role theft | Timelock, split roles (GUARDIAN, PAUSER), multi-sig admin |
| API layer spoofing | Misleading dashboard | API reads only from published ComplianceCore addresses; publish ABIs |
External audit scope (recommended)
contracts/hybx-omnl/*.sol— policy rounding, reentrancy (minimal external calls), access control.OMNLMirrorReceiver— decoding, version monotonicity, selector allowlist.- Operational: HSM usage for
commitReserve, CCIP operational runbooks.
Structured checklist: EXTERNAL_AUDIT_CHECKLIST.md.
Key ceremony (outline)
- Generate
RESERVE_COMMITTER/ admin keys in HSM; no plaintext long-lived prod keys in CI. - Document signer roster on-chain (
bytes32merkle root optional extension) for auditor parity.